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Abstract 
 
Even though volatility spillover effects in global equity markets have been documented 
extensively, the transmission of illiquidity across national borders has not. In this paper, 
we propose a multiplicative error model (MEM) for the dynamics of illiquidity. We 
empirically study the illiquidity and volatility spillover effects in eight developed equity 
markets during and after the recent financial crisis.  The results indicate that equity 
markets are interdependent, both in terms of volatility and illiquidity. Most markets 
show an increase in volatility and illiquidity spillover effects during the crisis. 
Furthermore, we find volatility and illiquidity transmission are highly relevant. 
Illiquidity is a more important channel than volatility in propagating the shocks in 
equity markets. Our results show an overall crucial role for illiquidity in the US market 
in influencing other equity markets’ illiquidity and volatility. These findings are of 
importance for policy makers as well as institutional and private investors. 
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1. Introduction 
For many years, especially following the global financial crisis, much has been made 
of the nature of financial market interdependence, mainly in terms of returns and return 
volatilities (King and Wadhwani 1990; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Diebold and Yilmaz, 
2009; Engle et al., 2012). However, market liquidity, as an equally important risk factor 
as volatility, has attracted less attention in the financial market interdependence 
literatures.  
The recent global financial crisis (2007-2009), suggests that, at times, market 
conditions can be severe and liquidity can decline or even disappear. Such illiquidity 
can spread to other markets if the liquidity shocks are systematic. The systematic nature 
of shocks in illiquidity across markets is due to: a) financial constraints affecting 
liquidity providers in different securities/markets simultaneously (Comerton-Forde et 
al., 2010); or b) a decline in the capital available to financial intermediaries active in 
multiple securities that triggers an increase in risk aversion, impairing the supply of 
liquidity in these securities/markets (Kyle and Xiong, 2001). Either way, this suggests 
that understanding the multivariate dynamics of financial markets’ liquidity is of 
importance to policy makers as well as institutional and private investors.  
In this paper, we propose a multiplicative error model (MEM) for the dynamics of 
illiquidity, and study the illiquidity spillover effects in global equity markets during and 
after the recent financial crisis.  Furthermore, we model the dynamics of illiquidity and 
volatility jointly, so that we can investigate the interdependence between illiquidity and 
volatility among the equity markets. An MEM-based model is chosen as it is preferred 
to alternative ways of modelling volatility/illiquidity spillover effects in the literature. 
First, relative to a VAR model (as used by Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009), an MEM does 
not suffer from problems caused by zero-valued observations and ensures that only non-
negative predictions are permitted. Second, relative to the multivariate GARCH model 
(as used by Bauwens et al., 2006), an MEM does not suffer from limitations in the 
number of markets that can be considered, since it can be estimated equation by 
equation. Third, relative to the GARCHX model of absolute returns, an MEM is more 
flexible, since a more flexible distribution (i.e., the general gamma distribution) can be 
adopted for nonnegative valued financial time series (i.e., absolute return, illiquidity or 
realized volatility).   
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We apply our analysis to eight developed equity markets over the period 2007-2016, 
devoting particular attention to the treatment of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis 
period. We find that equity markets are significantly interdependent, both in terms of 
volatility and illiquidity; with no markets independent of others. The global financial 
crisis brings significant changes to the volatility and illiquidity dynamics. Most markets 
show an increase in volatility and illiquidity spillover effects during the crisis. 
Furthermore, the volatility and illiquidity transmission are highly relevant. By 
comparing the spillover balance index between illiquidity and volatility, we find that 
illiquidity is a more important channel than volatility in propagating shocks in equity 
markets. Our results show that the illiquidity of US markets plays a crucial role in 
influencing illiquidity and volatility in other equity markets.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 describes the model and methodology. Section 4 introduces the dataset. 
Section 5 contains the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
This section reviews the theoretical explanations of illiquidity and volatility spillover 
effects and the associated empirical evidence.   
2.1 Liquidity spillovers 
Liquidity is defined as the ability to buy or sell large quantities of assets quickly and 
at a low cost. The comovements or commonalities in liquidity across markets are known 
in the literature as liquidity spillovers. Understanding the reasons for such liquidity 
spillovers is of broad interest because it throws light on the causes of sudden unexpected 
systematic liquidity crises.  
Theoretical economic explanations for liquidity spillovers rely on systematic 
variations in liquidity across borders. When a liquidity shock originates in one country, 
the interdependence of the real and financial economies induce systematic liquidity 
shocks across borders (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998, and van Rijckeghem and Weder, 
2001). In addition, global phenomena or common shocks such as (unexpected/large) 
changes in US interest rates, exchange rates, and/or oil prices may adversely affect the 
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economic fundamentals and market liquidity in several economies simultaneously, and 
potentially cause a systematic liquidity shock (Eichengreen et al., 1996). 
Liquidity spillover can also be explained using demand or supply side theories. The 
demand side theories argue that liquidity commonality arises from information 
asymmetries or the behaviour of international investors (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, 
King and Wadhwani, 1990, and Kodres and Pritsker, 2002). Information asymmetries 
make investors more uncertain about the actual economic fundamentals of a country. A 
crisis in one country may give a “wake-up call” to international investors to reassess 
the risks in other countries, and uninformed or less informed investors may find it 
difficult to extract the informed signal from the falling price. Consequently, they all 
follow the strategies of better informed investors, generating excess co-movements in 
price and liquidity across the markets (Calvo and Mendoza, 2000, Pasquariello, 2007, 
and Yuan, 2005). Other studies that adopt demand side theories include Koch et al. 
(2010), Kamara et al. (2008) and Karolyi et al. (2012). The supply-side theories suggest 
that liquidity commonality arises from liquidity providers’ information sharing and 
capital constraints. An example would be Comerton-Forde et al. (2010) who argue that 
financial constraints constitute a systematic liquidity factor because they affect liquidity 
providers in different securities/countries at the same time. Similarly, Kyle and Xiong 
(2001) suggest that a decline in the capital available to financial intermediaries active 
in multiple securities/countries can trigger an increase in risk aversion, impairing the 
supply of liquidity in these securities. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) also suggest 
that a huge market-wide decline in prices reduces the aggregate collateral of the market 
making sector, which feeds back as higher comovement in market liquidity. Similar 
studies also include Chordia et al. (2005), Coughenour and Saad (2004), Kamara et al. 
(2008) and Hameed et al. (2010).  
In terms of the empirical evidence, studies initially focused mainly on cross-
sectional analysis of liquidity spillovers, primarily because of data availability and 
computation techniques. More recent and relevant work on liquidity spillovers has been 
dominated by time series analysis. Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) study the 
co-movements in liquidity. They indicate that quoted spreads, quoted depth, and 
effective spreads co-move with market and industry-wide liquidity. Huberman and 
Halka (2001) document the presence of a systematic, time-varying component of 
liquidity. Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) propose a latent factor models of liquidity, 
aggregated across various liquidity measures, suggest that systematic liquidity is a 
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pricing factor. Corwin and Lipson (2011) find that commonality in liquidity is driven 
by the correlated trading decisions of professional traders. There is also a tranche of the 
literature in which trading volume is used as a measure of liquidity. These studies focus 
on volume spillover effects across different financial markets, and deliver somewhat 
mixed empirical findings (cf. Gebka, 2012; Gebka and Wohar, 2013, and Lin, 2013). 
Despite the number and breadth of previous studies of liquidity dynamics, they are 
still limited in the sense that they focus only on illiquidity spillovers in different 
financial markets within a particular country. By contrast, studies of illiquidity 
spillovers in global equity markets represent a relatively unexplored avenue of research.   
2.2 Volatility spillovers 
The literature on volatility spillovers is extensive. Theories that explain volatility 
transmission mechanisms belong to two groups. One group argue that the economic 
fundamentals of different countries are interconnected by their cross-border flows of 
goods, services, and capital. When a crisis originates in one country, this 
interdependence of economies through real and financial linkages becomes a carrier of 
crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998; van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). Another 
group of theories argue that financial crises spread from one country to another due to 
market imperfections or the behaviour of international investors (Diamond and Dybvig, 
1983; King and Wadhwani, 1990; Kodres and Pritsker, 2002). 
The empirical studies investigating these effects include Engle, Ito and Lin (1990), 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Edwards and Susmel (2001, 2003), Fratzscher (2003), 
Gallo and Otranto (2007), Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) and Engle et al. (2012). 
Generally, they can be categorized according to the three types of empirical model 
employed: viz. GARCH, VAR and MEM. Typically, these authors find significant and 
substantial cross-market volatility spillovers. They often find a dominant role for the 
US market as a source for volatility transmission in global equity markets.   
2.3 Interaction between illiquidity and volatility 
The relationship between asset liquidity and return volatility has been addressed 
both theoretically and empirically. Market microstructure theories predict that higher 
return volatility increases illiquidity (e.g., Stoll, 1978a). A simplified description of the 
mechanism behind these theories runs as follows. In the one direction, market-makers, 
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who must hold the stock, bear higher inventory risk for more volatile stocks. Higher 
volatility increases inventory risk and leads to higher bid-ask spreads (e.g., Benston and 
Hagerman, 1974). In the reverse direction, decreasing liquidity could increase asset 
price fluctuation (e.g., Subrahmanyam, 1994).  These theories are supported by 
empirical studies that have confirmed the predicted positive relation between illiquidity 
and return volatility (e.g., Stoll, 1978b, 2000; Amihud and Mendelson, 1989; Statman 
et al., 2006; Bao and Pan, 2013).  
There is also reason to believe that cross market effects between illiquidity and 
volatility may be significant. For example, if there are leads and lags in trading activity 
in response to systematic information shocks, then trading activity in one market may 
predict trading activity, and, in turn, liquidity in another. Similarly, leads and lags in 
volatility and liquidity shocks may have cross-effects. Thus, if systematic shocks to 
liquidity and volatility get reflected in one market before another, then liquidity in one 
market could influence future liquidity in another.  More generally, the above variables 
in one market may forecast the corresponding variables in the other markets. 
Empirically, Chordia et al. (2005) study the spillover effect between US stock and bond 
markets, but find no evidence of a causal relationship between liquidity in one market 
and volatility on another. By contrast, Lee and Rui (2002) find that trading volume (a 
measure of liquidity) in the US influences return volatility in Japan and the UK. 
Furthermore, Gebka (2012) show that absolute stock returns (a measure of return 
volatility) in the US has a strong influence on trading volume in Asian markets. Despite 
this attention, little if any relevant research has been done on the spillover effects 
between illiquidity and volatility across global equity markets.  
2.4  Summary 
Volatility spillover effects have been studied extensively in the literature; however, 
the dynamics of illiquidity and illiquidity spillovers have received less attention from 
an empirical perspective. There is also no relevant research on the interaction between 
illiquidity and volatility across global equity markets. We focus on these two issues in 
this paper. Specifically, we empirically study the illiquidity spillover effects in global 
equity markets during and after the recent financial crisis. Furthermore, we model the 
dynamics of illiquidity and volatility jointly, so that we can investigate the 
interdependence between illiquidity and volatility in equity markets. The empirical 
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model we adopt is an MEM-type model, which is close to that used by Engle et al. 
(2012). We innovate by using a realized volatility and illiquidity proxy in each market.   
3. The Methodology Framework 
3.1 Liquidity proxy and model 
The illiquidity measure we employ here is the daily ratio of absolute stock return to its 
dollar volume, as proposed by Amihud (2002). It can be interpreted as the daily price 
response associated with one dollar of trading volume, thus serving as a rough measure 
of price impact.1 The daily illiqidity tlq  is defined as:  
( )
.
t
t
t t
abs rlq
P volume
   (1) 
Since the illiquidity is non-negatively valued, and highly persistent over time (as 
shown in Figure 1 and Table 1 in section 4), we follow Engle et al. (2012) and use the 
MEM to model the dynamics of illiquidity. The MEM was initially proposed by Engle 
(2002) and has been widely used to model the dynamics of non-negative valued highly 
persistent financial time series (i.e., absolute return, daily range, realized volatility, 
trading duration, trading volume and bid-ask spread). Conditional on the information 
set 1tI  , illiqidity in market i , ,i tlq , is modelled as   
, 1 , ,| , 1,2, .lq lqi t t i t i tlq I i k     (2) 
where the innovation term 
,
lq
i t  is a unit mean random variable, such that
, 1| ~ . . (1, )lq lqi t t iI i i d  , and k is the number of markets included in the analysis. The 
conditional expectation of 
,i tlq , ,lqi t , can be specified as a base MEM (1,1), 
, , 1 , 1,
lq l l l lq
i t i ii i t i i tw lq        (3) 
To study the illiquidity spillovers, we include the lagged daily illiquidity observed in 
other markets in the base specification: 
, , 1 , 1 j, 1
lq l l l lq l
i t i ii i t i i t j t
j i
w lq lq          . (4) 
                                                 
1
 There are finer and better measures of illiquidity, such as the bid-ask spread (quoted or effective), transaction-
by-transaction market impact, or the probability of information-based trading. These measures, however, require a 
lot of microstructure data that are not available in many stock markets. And, even when available, the data do not 
cover very long periods of time. The measure used here enables us to construct a long time series of illiquidity that 
is necessary to test illiquidity spillover effects in equity markets. This would be very hard to do with the finer 
microstructure measures of illiquidity. 
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The other terms that are of interest in the framework can be included. For example:  Time dummies: tDC  (during crisis = 1)  Interaction terms between illiquidity of all markets and 1tDC  to 
accommodate the possibility of changing links during the crisis   Asymmetric effects (Glosten et al, 1993): 
, 1 1i tS    if , 1 0i tr   ; , 1 0i tS    if 
, 1 0i tr   ,  denoting *, 1 , 1 , 1i t i t i tlq S lq    
The general model is thus:  
*
, , 1 , 1 j, 1 1 , 1 , 1 1
,
lq l l l lq l l l l
i t i ii i t i i t ij t i t i i t ij j t t
j i i j
w lq lq DC lq lq DC                     . (5) 
3.2 Volatility model 
Rather than using a high-low range, as in Engle et al. (2012), we use realized 
volatility based on 5-min intra-day squared returns to build a volatility proxy.  The 
evidence presented by Patton et al. (2013) shows that it is difficult to beat the simple 5 
min realized variance by other realized measures of volatility. The 5-min realized 
volatility can be obtained from the Oxford-Man Institute of Realized Volatility lab. As 
realized volatility is non-negative valued and highly persistent over time, we follow 
Engle and Gallo (2006) and Shephard and Sheppard (2010) and use an MEM to model 
the dynamics of realized volatility. Conditional on the information set 1tI  , realized 
volatility in market i, 
,i trv , is modelled as   
, 1 , ,| , 1,2, .rv rvi t t i t i trv I i k     (6) 
where the innovation term 
,
rv
i t  is a unit mean random variable. The conditional 
expectation of 
,i trv , ,
rv
i t , can be specified as a base MEM (1,1), 
, , 1 , 1
rv v v v rv
i t i ii i t i i tw rv       . (7) 
We then include the lagged realized volatility observed in other markets, 
asymmetric effects, a crisis period dummy, and the interaction terms between volatility 
and time dummy of all markets; the general model is then:  
*
, , 1 , 1 j, 1 1 , 1 , 1 1
,
rv v v v rv v v v v
i t i ii i t i i t ij t i t i i t ij j t t
j i i j
w rv rv DC rv rv DC                      (8) 
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3.3 Liquidity and volatility spillover model 
To study the illiquidity and volatility interaction in financial markets, we add lagged 
volatility (illiquidity) and the interaction between lagged volatility (illiquidity) to 1tDC   
in all markets to the illiquidity (volatility) model. The liquidity-volatility model is then: 
2
 
, , 1 , 1 j, 1 j, 1
,
*
1 , 1 , 1 1 , 1 1
, ,
lq l l l lq l lv
i t i ii i t i i t ij t ij t
j i i j
l l l lv
i t i i t ij j t t ij j t t
i j i j
w lq lq rv
DC lq lq DC rv DC
     
   
   
     
    
   
    (9) 
, , 1 , 1 j, 1 j, 1
,
*
1 , 1 , 1 1 , 1 1
, ,
rv v v v rv v vl
i t i ii i t i i t ij t ij t
j i i j
v v v vl
i t i i t ij j t t ij j t t
i j i j
w rv rv lq
DC rv rv DC lq DC
     
   
   
     
    
   
    (10) 
To estimate the model, we assume that the innovation term 
, 1|lqi t tI   follows a 
generalized gamma distribution with a shape 1  and scale parameter 2  to ensure a 
large degree of flexibility. Then the log-likelihood function for the illiquidity model is:  
 
2
, ,
1 2 2 1
1 , ,
log[ ( )] log( ) ( 1) log
T
i t i t
lq lq
t i t i t
lq lq
L
                                (11a) 
Following Engle et al. (2012), the illiquidity model in (9) can be estimated equation 
by equation. The same log-likelihood function and estimation approach can be obtained 
for the volatility model. The likelihood function is: 
 
2
, ,
1 2 2 1
1 , ,
log[ ( )] log( ) ( 1) log
T
i t i t
rv rv
t i t i t
rv rv
L
                           .  (11b) 
3.4 Spillover analysis 
Engle et al. (2012) propose a quantitative measure of volatility spillover effects for 
several markets, based on the measure of spillovers as a response to shocks. Following 
their lead, we derive similar measures for our liquidity-volatility model.  
                                                 
2
 A second (or more) own lags could be added in models (9) and (10), but the empirical results (as shown in 
Table 3 and 4) show that the first lag captures most of the persistence for all the illiquidity and volatility series except 
the realized volatility of the Australian market. For simplicity, we use one lag in model (9) and (10).  
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        Let 1, 2, ,( , , ) 't t t k tlq lq lq lq , 1, 2, ,( , , ) 'lq lq lq lqt t t k t     and 1, 2, ,( , , ) 'lq lq lq lqt t t k t    , 
where k is the number of markets included in the analysis. Let 1, 2, ,( , , ) 't t t k trv rv rv rv ,
1, 2, ,( , , ) 'rv rv rv rvt t t k t     and 1, 2, ,( , , ) 'rv rv rv rvt t t k t    . Conditional on the information 
available at time t , (9) and (10) can be stacked in a compact matrix form as: 
*
1 1
1 *
1 1
1 11
1 11
lq l l l lv l
tt t
trv v v vl v v
tt t
lql l lv
t tt
rvv vl v
t tt
lq lqA A
DC
rv rvA A
lq DCB
rv DCB
     
   
 
 
                                                         
 (12) 
Further assuming that ( ', ')t t tx lq rv , ( ', ')lq rvt t t   , and ( ', ')lq rvt t t   , (12) can be 
expressed as: 
*
1 1 1 1 1 1
t t t
t t t t t t t
x
W DC Ax x B x DC
                (13) 
where  denotes the Hadamard (element by element) product.   
We will use MEM-based forecasts to derive a spillover balance index later. To this 
end we require a formula for ( | )t tE x I , where 0  . tx 
 
is not known and needs to 
be substituted with its corresponding conditional expectation ( | )t t tE x I    . The 
dummy tDC  is fixed to the value that it had in t , so ( | )t t tE DC I DC   , and forecasts 
of the asymmetric effect is ( | ) 0.5t tE S I   3, hence for  
2 1 1 1 1
1
0.5
( 0.5 )
t t t t t t t
t t t t
W DC A B DC
W DC PC A B DC
                           (14) 
And then, for 2,   
1 1( 0.5 )t t t tW DC A B DC            (15) 
which can be solved recursively for any horizon . 
Following Engle et al. (2012), let us recall the MEM in a system, 
t t tx   ,   1| ~ ( , )t t D I    (16) 
The innovation vector t  has a mean vector I  with all components’ unity and general 
variance-covariance matrix  , i.e. 1| ~ ( , )t t D I   . We can interpret
( , 1)t t t tE x I     , i.e., the expectation of tx  conditional on t  being equal to the 
                                                 
3
 See the discussion associated with the asymmetric GARCH model (Glosten et al., 1993). 
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unit vector I: this is the basis for the dynamic forecast obtained before. Let us now 
derive a different dynamic solution, ( ) ( )( , 1 )i it t t tE x I s      , for a generic i th 
element ( )is .  The i th element equal to the unconditional standard deviation of  it  and 
the other terms j i equal to the linear projection   ,, , 21 1 i jj t i t i i
i
E
        . The 
element-by-element division ( ) of the two vectors,
 
( )
,
i
t  , is given by 
( ) ( )
,
1i it t t       , 1,..., K   (17) 
where K is the number of periods that shocks can last. Given the multiplicative nature 
of the model, ( )
,
i
t   gives us the set of responses (relative changes) in the forecast profile 
starting at time t  for a horizon   brought about by a 1 standard deviation shock in the 
i th market.  
We use ,
,
j i
t   to denote the cumulated impact of the shock from market i  to market 
j :  
, ,
, ,
1
.
K
j i j i
t t    (18) 
So ,
,
j i
t   is a way to assess the total change induced by the shock.  The volatility/illiquidity 
spillover balance ( i ) is expressed as the ratio of the average responses “from” to the 
average response “to” (excluding one’s own): 
,
1
,
1
.
T j i
tt
j i
i T i j
tt
j i
  
  (19) 
Suppose i  is one’s own market, and j  (where j i ) are all other markets (excluding its 
own market), then the numerator is interpreted as the average responses “to”, or the 
average responses of all other markets to the shocks that happened in one’s own market. 
The denominator is interpreted the average response “from”, or the average responses 
of one’s own market to the shocks that happened in other markets.  A value of i bigger 
than 1 signals that market as a net creator of spillover. It is notable that the effect of 
shocks to its own market is not included, so the effect on the size of a shock (i.e., one 
standard deviation shock) between different markets is trivial.   
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4. Dataset 
In the empirical analysis, we choose eight developed international stock markets. The 
US: SP500, Canada (CA): TSE300, UK: FTSE100, Germany (GE): DAX30, France 
(FR): CAC40, Japan (JP): Nikkei225, Hong Kong (HK): Hang Seng, and Australia 
(AU): ATX, for the period from January 3, 2007 to October 18, 2016. The global 
financial crisis that started in the US sub-prime mortgage market in February 2007 
reached its climax in mid-September 2008 with the disastrous collapse of the Lehman 
Brothers (on August 9, 2007). As the global financial crisis unfolded in several stages, 
financial markets all around the world went through wild fluctuations, with 
volatility/illiquidity spreading across markets at an unprecedented speed. It was not 
until 2009 that the main developed countries showed any recovery. Therefore, we 
define the crisis period from August 9, 2007 to June 30, 2009 (where August 9, 2007 
was the date that Lehman Brothers went bankrupt which is considered as the start of 
the financial crisis, and June 30, 2009 was the date that the Business Cycle Dating 
Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research announced the end of the 
financial crisis).4 The remaining time is the post crisis period. 
We obtain the daily stock index and daily turnover by volume for the eight stock 
indices from Datastream. The realized volatility is obtained from the Oxford Man 
Institution of Realized Volatility lab. The daily return is calculated as the log daily price 
change. The daily return and the realized volatility series are transformed into 
percentage and squared percentage terms by multiplying by 100 and 10,000 
respectively. We standardize the dollar volume by dividing by its mean for each market, 
in order to be in the same magnitude for all markets.  We then calculate the illiquidity 
according to Amihud (2002), given in (1). 
The data are from three different time zones: Europe (UK, GE, FR), East Asian (JP, 
HK, AU) and America (US, CA). The trading time on one trading day are illustrated as 
following: 
East Asia (JP, HK, AU)5 Europe (UK, GE, FR)6 America (US, CA) 
0:00 – 6:00 GMT 8:00 – 16:30 GMT       14:30 – 21:30 GMT 
                                                 
4
 The recession in US is officially announced to be ended in the second quarter of 2009 by Business Cycle 
Dating Committee, National Bureau of Economic Research.   http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html 
5
  The Hong Kong Stock Exchange trading time is 0:30 – 8:00 GMT 
6
  The Frankfurt Stock Exchange trading time is 8:00 – 16:45 GMT       
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There is no overlapping trading between East Asia and Europe (or America). 
However, there are two hours overlapping between Europe and America trading. The 
protocol of Fleming and Lopez (1999) and Clements et al. (2015) is adopted to delimit 
the global trading day effects. Specifically, the close time in the East Asian and 
Australian exchanges is ahead of the open time in the Europe and America exchanges, 
so we use “same trading day” to denote the lagged effect from JP, HK and AU to Europe 
(or America). As there is overlapping trading between Europe and America, we treat 
them as the same trading zone.   
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the illiquidity series. The average illiquidity 
during the crisis period is about 50% larger than that in the whole sample period for all 
the markets. This suggests that market liquidity declines during the crisis and that it 
happens for all the markets. The skewness and kurtosis statistics show that all illiquidity 
series are positively skewed and highly leptokurtic. The Ljung Box (LB) statistics for 
up to 12 lags for illiquidity series indicate the presence of high serial autocorrelations; 
thus models that are capable of allowing for such dynamics are required. The standard 
deviation is appropriately the same magnitude as the mean, indicating no 
overdispersion for the illiquidity series. 
A similar pattern can be observed for volatility series in Table 2. The mean of 
realized volatility during the crisis period is three times larger than the mean of volatility 
in the whole sample period. The LB statistics indicate that realized volatility has strong 
serial autocorrelations. The overdispersion (the ratio of standard deviation to mean) is 
about 2 to 3. A large degree of overdispersion requires a large value of “alpha” (ARCH 
coefficient). The skewness and kurtosis show that all realized volatility series are 
positively skewed and highly leptokurtic. These, together with the observed 
Table 1: Statistics of illiquidity for all markets 
Mean US CA UK GE FR JP HK AU 
Whole 
period 
0.82  0.83  0.94  1.13  1.11  1.35  1.14  0.87  
Crisis 1.21  1.47  1.28  1.50  1.32  2.24  1.76  1.47  
Post-crisis 0.73  0.68  0.90  1.07  1.11  1.19  0.97  0.73  
Statistics         
Minimum 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Maximum 10.72  10.80  8.92  70.85  8.88  16.86  10.30  8.66  
S.D. 0.83  0.93  0.94  1.87  1.03  1.49  1.05  0.90  
Skewness 3.04  3.38  2.56  22.94  2.05  3.37  2.23  2.96  
Kurtosis 22.74  22.17  13.86  802.85  10.00  22.93  11.62  17.46  
LB(12) 979.19  3471.14  1534.28  250.51  1000.15  3063.68 2501.70  2919.08 
Note: S.D. denotes the standard deviation.  LB(12) denotes the Ljung Box statistics up to order 12. 
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overdispersion, suggest that a more flexible distribution such as the generalized gamma 
distribution rather than the exponential distribution, which has been used in Engle et al. 
(2012), is needed for the modelling of realized volatility.   
Their features are also reflected in Figure 1. The stock indices decline and the 
market illiquidity and return volatility increase during the crisis for all the markets. 
After the crisis, the stock indices soon recover, market liquidity improves and is 
persistent (that is, it remains high in the future).  The realized volatility is much lower 
than that in the crisis period but there are a few jumps. The graph shows that the 
illiquidity and realized volatility are very persistent over time. Large 
illiquidities/volatilities tend to be followed by large illiquidities/volatilities. These 
features, together with the LB statistics in Tables 1 and 2, suggest that MEM models 
(incorporating structural change during a crisis) are suitable for the dynamics of the 
illiquidity and realized volatility.  
5. Empirical Results 
Based on the equation by equation estimation results, we proceed to select a more 
parsimonious specification, based on the significance of zero restrictions.7 Given the 
large number of coefficients in the general specification in (9) and (10), leaving all 
coefficients regardless of their significance results in inefficient estimates and therefore 
less precise spillover forecasts (Engle et al., 2012). We only report the coefficients 
estimates that are significant at the 5% level.  The effects, which are significant in each 
                                                 
7
 The parameters are significantly different from zero at 5% significant level.  
Table 2: Statistics of realized volatility for all markets 
Mean US CA UK GE FR JP HK AU 
Whole 
period 
1.34  0.81  0.86  1.58  1.52  1.12  0.94  0.64  
Crisis 3.75  2.11  2.21  3.30  3.06  2.46  2.75  1.47  
Post-crisis 0.79  0.52  0.55  1.21  1.20  0.84  0.62  0.45  
Statistics         
Minimum 0.02  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.04  
Maximum 77.48  35.96  31.18  58.83  51.22  32.29  43.73  15.25  
S.D. 3.22  1.90  1.57  2.93  2.56  2.13  1.94  0.97  
Skewness 9.77  9.49  8.70  9.72  9.42  7.47  12.14  6.19  
Kurtosis 162.12  128.15  119.27  147.68  141.05  77.73  209.13  62.01  
LB(12) 8580.98  7899.30  8000.19  7089.62  6619.17  6321.64  3816.29  6348.43  
Note: S.D. denotes the standard deviation. LB(12) denotes the Ljung Box statistics up to order 12. 
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market, are reported in Tables 3 and 4; the model diagnostics are summarized in the 
lower panels. We report the estimated shape parameters for the generalised gamma 
distribution, the values of the log-likelihood functions, Bayesian Information Criteria 
(BIC) and LB statistics for autocorrelation in the model residuals. The detailed 
estimation results are reported in the Appendix.  
5.1 Are there illiquidity spillover effects in equity markets? 
From Table 3, we can find significant illiquidity spillover effects. Six out of eight 
markets show significant interaction in liquidity with other markets; four of them show 
an extra illiquidity spillover effect during the crisis. CA is an exception, it is 
independent from other markets’ illiquidity, but significantly interacted with other 
markets’ volatility during the crisis. Overall, all markets show significant interactions 
with one another in terms of illiquidity. This suggests that when there is a sudden 
shortage of liquidity in one market (either arising from demand or supply side factors), 
the illiquidity shock can spread to other markets, which leads to the decline of liquidity 
in other markets, causing the comovement in illiquidity across equity markets. The 
results confirm the effect of equity market comovements in liquidity. 
Interestingly, we find that no casual effects from volatility to illiquidity within its 
own market, which is contrast to Statman et al. (2006).  However, four out of eight 
markets show a significant transmission from volatility of other markets to illiquidity 
in its own market. These effects are enhanced during the crisis (seven out of eight 
markets are significant). Only the US market is independent from other markets. These 
results are consistent with Gebka (2001). 8 These results confirm the existence of causal 
effects from return volatility to illiquidity (e.g., Stoll, 1978a). However, these casual 
effects are only significant across borders.  
Lastly, all markets exhibit significant degrees of asymmetry in terms of the 
transmission of illiquidity associated with good and bad news. Bad news tends to 
increase illiquidity more than good news.  
 
                                                 
8
 Gebka (2001) shows that absolute return (a proxy for return volatility) in the US market has a significant 
influence on the volume (a proxy for liquidity) in Asian markets.  
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The lower panel of Table 3 summarizes the model diagnostics. The estimated 
gamma parameters ϕ1 and ϕ2 for the illiquidity process are fairly similar across markets 
(ϕ1 ranges from 1.2 to 2 and ϕ2 ranges from 0.5 to 1), showing that the illiquidity 
processes have similar characteristics in different markets. The LB statistics are small 
and insignificant, suggesting that our model captures the dynamics of the illiquidity 
processes successfully.    
5.2 Are there volatility spillover effects in equity markets?  
From Table 4, we observe a similar pattern as in Table 3. We find significant 
volatility spillover effects. All markets show significant interaction in volatility with 
other markets; five of them show increased volatility spillover effects during the crisis. 
Therefore, equity markets are interdependent in terms of return volatility, and the level 
of interdependence increases during the financial crisis. These empirical results are 
consistent with previous empirical studies (i.e., Gallo and Otranto, 2007;  Diebold and 
Yilmaz, 2009; Engle, Gallo and Velucchi, 2012). 
Table 3: Summary of the illiquidity model for each market 
 US CA UK GE FR JP HK AU 
Other markets 
illiquidity 
×  × × ×  × × 
Other markets 
illiquidity during crisis 
    × × × × 
Own volatility          
Other markets volatility    × × × ×  
Other markets volatility 
during crisis 
 × × × × × × × 
Shift during crisis ×   ×  ×   
Own asymmetric effect 0.156 0.093 0.118 0.129 0.105 0.118 0.109 0.119 
Model Diagnostics         
ϕ1 1.322 1.629 1.881 0.870 1.757 1.354 2.082 1.691 
ϕ2 0.765 0.622 0.509 1.576 0.589 0.776 0.494 0.635 
-Loglik 1236.5 954.7 1319.6 1699.6 1680.3 1966.7 1593.6 1151.1 
BIC 2540.5 1976.9 2706.7 3496.6 3473.0 4023.4 3299.7 2414.7 
LB(12) 18.98 9.30 8.46 7.21 9.23 22.92 21.48 10.98 
Note: A cross (×) indicates the presence of significant additional links relative to the own market 
specification. ϕ1 and ϕ2 are estimated shape parameters for the generalised gamma distribution. Loglik 
denotes the values of the log-likelihood. BIC is Bayesian Information Criteria. LB(12) denotes the 
Ljung Box statistics up to order 12.  
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Interestingly, no significant casual effects from illiquidity to volatility within a 
market are found. However, the causal effects from the illiquidity of other markets to 
the volatility of the own market are significant and these effects are increased during 
the crisis.  
Finally, all markets exhibit significant degrees of asymmetry in terms of the 
transmission of volatility associated with good and bad news. Bad news tends to 
increase volatility more than good news. 
From the model diagnostics, it can be seen that the estimated gamma parameters ϕ1 
and ϕ2 are also similar across markets, but ϕ1 ranges from 0.5 to 0.7 and ϕ2 ranges from 
7 to 9, showing that the volatility series have different characteristics from that of the 
illiquidity series. Again, ϕ1 and ϕ2 are significantly different from 1, suggesting that the 
generalized gamma distributions are the most suitable distribution for realized volatility 
(cf. the exponential distribution adopted in Engle et al. 2012). The LB statistics are 
small and insignificant for all the markets except AU, suggesting that our model 
captures the dynamics of the volatility process.  
5.3 Which effects play a more important role in spreading the shocks 
across markets – illiquidity or volatility spillover effects?   
From Tables 3 and 4, there are two channels of shocks transmissions in equity 
markets: illiquidity and volatility spillovers. The illiquidity spillovers are due to 
Table 4: Summary of the volatility model for each market 
 US CA UK GE FR JP HK AU 
Other markets volatility × × × × × × × × 
Other markets volatility 
during crisis 
× × × × ×    
Own illiquidity    ×     
Other markets illiquidity × × ×  × × × × 
Other markets illiquidity 
during crisis 
×  × × × ×  × 
 
Shift during crisis    ×     
Own asymmetric effect 0.253 0.193 0.000  0.078 0.092 0.113 0.059 0.112 
Model Diagnostics         
ϕ1 0.561 0.610 0.730 0.678 0.674 0.507 0.655 0.575 
ϕ2 7.589 7.502 8.273 7.630 8.775 9.958 7.915 8.750 
-Loglik 624.3 184.9 187.7 1173.8 1129.6 844.5 538.7 177.0 
BIC 1368.6 257.4 277.8 2452.5 2356.7 1763.9 1167.4 234.1 
LB(12) 8.49 7.71 19.70 12.45 19.88 9.00 5.16 91.21** 
Note: A cross (×) indicates the presence of significant additional links relative to the own market 
specification. ϕ1 and ϕ2 are estimated shape parameters for the generalised gamma distribution. Loglik 
denotes the values of the log-likelihood. BIC is Bayesian Information Criteria. LB(12) denotes the 
Ljung Box statistics up to order 12. ** denote significance at 5% level.  
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systematic variation in the demand or supply of liquidity, which affects the liquidity in 
different markets at the same time.  The volatility spillover is due to fundamental-based 
reasons or to investor behaviour-based reasons.  
Our empirical results show that there are significant interactions between the two 
effects. The shocks in illiquidity affect the volatility of other markets, and vice versa. 
The question is which one plays a more important role in transmitting the shocks to 
other markets. We use the spillover balance index derived in section 3.4 to explore this 
question. The spillover balance index that has a value bigger than 1 signals that market 
as a net creator of spillovers. The results are reported in Table 5. 
From Table 5, it can be seen that US and German markets are the main illiquidity 
spillover providers, as the illiquidity spillover balances for the US and Germany are 4.9 
and 1.7, respectively. Canada, France, and Hong Kong are more or less balanced, while 
the UK, Japan and Australia are the main illiquidity spillover takers. The US market 
has the largest spillover balances index, implying that it plays a central role in illiquidity 
spillover to other markets; Germany is the second most important market.  
Regarding volatility spillovers, the US and Japan are the only markets that have a 
spillover balance index more than 1, as all the other markets’ spillover balance indices 
are less than 1.  This suggests all the other markets are volatility spillover takers. 
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Table 5: Summary of the volatility/illiquidity impacts of a one-standard deviation shock to the market in the column heading 9 
 From illiquidity  From volatility  
 US CA UK GE FR JP HK AU  US CA UK GE FR JP HK AU  
To illiquidity/volatility  illiquidity/volatility  
US 9.47 2.89 1.21 0.77 0.90 0.19 0.09 0.71  2.57 1.14 0.86 0.74 0.67 1.00 0.35 0.18 14.26 
CA 13.19 24.78 7.43 4.36 6.79 0.35 2.14 1.57  6.01 6.51 2.19 1.94 1.94 2.56 2.20 0.72 59.89 
UK 6.90 9.96 46.68 24.09 29.89 2.31 6.70 6.64  12.34 8.86 4.92 5.55 4.72 3.56 1.22 2.15 129.81 
GE 3.23 3.47 5.48 4.78 3.42 3.54 2.57 2.28  4.68 4.11 2.63 2.63 2.49 3.27 1.80 2.01 47.61 
FR 7.14 12.18 13.36 11.82 17.81 2.60 3.15 5.68  5.45 4.17 1.48 1.74 1.63 2.64 1.22 2.00 76.25 
JP 3.41 3.47 22.01 10.15 12.65 26.29 6.28 9.84  5.82 5.11 2.98 4.41 3.79 5.91 0.69 4.19 100.71 
HK 3.77 5.98 2.54 0.90 1.10 4.00 5.09 1.26  3.44 3.47 1.99 1.87 1.87 2.30 1.37 1.36 37.22 
AU 6.76 13.16 8.53 4.02 6.21 7.04 2.60 9.15  3.96 3.89 1.32 0.88 0.90 1.97 1.54 3.20 65.97 
US 2.33 1.37 4.82 1.30 1.71 11.70 3.82 2.42  8.45 7.25 4.03 4.01 3.95 6.71 3.78 3.38 62.56 
CA 2.97 2.34 14.96 6.50 8.07 8.37 3.15 3.52  7.80 7.37 3.76 4.08 3.72 5.79 2.73 3.01 80.77 
UK 3.30 0.86 6.38 2.62 3.20 7.96 2.12 1.32  7.04 5.93 4.13 4.18 3.99 5.84 2.58 2.73 60.03 
GE 4.70 1.63 5.78 2.90 3.38 1.24 0.82 0.81  5.45 4.09 3.96 5.81 4.49 4.81 2.23 2.28 48.54 
FR 3.12 0.77 3.94 1.59 1.87 4.60 1.45 0.68  6.51 5.23 3.87 4.28 4.28 5.19 2.60 2.47 48.16 
JP 2.07 0.82 6.79 3.08 3.92 3.76 0.82 1.75  4.49 3.90 2.02 2.16 2.05 9.87 2.44 2.90 42.96 
HK 1.67 1.02 7.31 3.26 4.10 3.64 1.58 1.34  5.12 4.64 2.99 3.08 2.48 5.62 4.84 2.45 50.30 
AU 5.60 1.78 5.39 2.77 3.26 1.11 0.61 0.48  4.94 3.75 2.64 2.97 2.40 4.35 2.18 1.94 44.23 
 70.15 61.71 115.90 80.10 90.44 62.40 37.88 40.29  85.63 72.04 41.64 44.52 41.08 61.51 28.93 35.06 0.00 
Spillover  
Balance 4.92 1.03 0.89 1.68 1.19 0.62 1.02 0.61  1.37 0.89 0.69 0.92 0.85 1.43 0.58 0.79  
Note: Spillover balance index bigger than 1 signals that market as a net creator of spillover. 
 
  
                                                 
9
 Following Engle et al. (2012), we choose K=200 in eq (17) to allow the shocks to disappear completely.  
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Table 6: Summary of the standardised volatility/illiquidity impacts of a one-unit shock to the market in the column heading 
 From illiquidity  From volatility  
 US CA UK GE FR JP HK AU  US CA UK GE FR JP HK AU  
To illiquidity/volatility  illiquidity/volatility  
US 8.11 3.40 2.65 2.41 3.81 0.36 0.39 0.25  2.95 1.51 0.78 0.85 0.82 1.06 0.45 0.11 21.81 
CA 5.66 6.69 13.41 7.44 9.99 2.15 5.00 3.23  9.10 6.94 3.78 3.63 3.57 3.51 2.59 2.58 82.59 
UK 19.38 13.90 51.71 25.95 34.39 2.15 7.75 6.45  18.15 11.66 5.50 5.72 5.27 3.49 2.20 2.67 164.63 
GE 3.21 2.81 8.48 2.26 1.51 1.78 3.30 2.31  7.44 6.21 4.58 4.50 4.25 3.44 2.63 2.70 59.14 
FR 17.28 12.22 35.62 32.39 48.67 1.29 6.34 4.60  16.12 9.11 3.96 5.46 4.59 5.44 2.36 2.48 159.26 
JP 13.90 11.22 36.95 22.63 33.07 18.44 9.43 8.19  15.81 10.55 4.44 4.20 4.52 5.66 1.02 3.58 185.17 
HK 1.82 2.44 5.81 0.90 1.23 0.75 7.00 2.08  5.15 4.29 2.73 1.98 2.21 1.84 1.83 1.80 36.88 
AU 5.97 3.79 9.89 4.59 6.04 0.98 2.36 4.03  6.70 4.65 3.04 3.48 3.03 3.09 2.28 2.92 62.83 
US 6.49 5.20 15.04 7.18 9.85 4.48 6.07 3.90  13.38 9.72 5.12 4.27 4.68 5.80 4.19 3.62 95.60 
CA 6.37 5.46 16.06 6.62 8.08 3.96 4.83 3.82  12.46 10.07 5.44 4.74 5.07 5.71 4.00 3.96 96.59 
UK 5.15 3.91 10.59 4.27 5.09 3.35 3.90 2.74  11.75 9.03 6.32 5.15 5.64 5.95 3.92 3.80 84.24 
GE 5.45 3.81 11.42 3.99 4.42 2.31 3.67 2.58  10.96 8.61 6.15 7.21 6.51 5.80 4.09 4.01 83.78 
FR 6.07 4.55 13.15 6.25 7.79 2.86 4.10 2.91  11.87 8.99 5.87 5.87 6.09 5.77 3.75 3.77 93.57 
JP 5.14 4.13 14.38 6.37 8.42 2.42 2.39 2.63  9.05 6.79 3.74 2.68 3.21 6.73 2.43 2.61 76.40 
HK 2.61 2.21 7.05 2.42 3.50 0.61 2.57 1.99  6.88 5.40 3.70 3.28 3.15 4.58 5.12 2.94 52.86 
AU 5.37 3.09 6.55 2.55 3.56 0.67 1.90 1.75  7.64 5.78 3.99 3.81 3.68 4.74 3.34 3.20 58.41 
 109.87 82.15 207.05 135.93 140.74 30.13 64.01 49.45  152.01 109.24 62.81 59.63 60.20 65.89 41.08 43.55 0.00 
Spillover  
Balance 5.04 0.99 1.26 2.30 0.88 0.16 1.74 0.79  1.59 1.13 0.75 0.71 0.64 0.86 0.78 0.75  
Note: Spillover balance index bigger than 1 signals that market as a net creator of spillover  
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Comparing the illiquidity and volatility spillover balance index, it is found that the 
former is much larger than the latter. Most illiquidity spillover indices are greater than 
1, while the opposite holds for volatility spillover indices. These indicate that it is 
illiquidity which plays a more important role in spreading the shocks to the other 
markets, either through illiquidity spillover effects or through the interaction between 
illiquidity and volatility. Moreover, the illiquidity of US markets plays a central role in 
influencing other equity markets’ illiquidity and volatility.  
A concern of the spillover balance index is that illiquidity and volatility are 
measured in different units such that they may have different variances and distributions, 
and thereby may not be comparable directly.10 However, the spillover balance derived 
in this paper (also in Engle et al. 2012) is an index. As defined in formula (19), the own 
effect (the effect of a one standard deviation shock to its own market) is excluded in 
calculating the spillover balance index. Therefore, the effect of the illiquidity and 
volatility measures having different variances in different markets should not affect the 
spillover balance index. Nevertheless, we conduct a robustness test on the spillover 
balance index. Specifically, we firstly standardise all the volatility and illiquidity series, 
so that they have the same mean. We then calculate the impact of a one unit (rather than 
a one standard deviation) shock on the original market. By doing this, volatility and 
illiquidity are necessarily measured in the same units. The shocks on volatility and 
illiquidity also have the same units. Consequently, the spillover balance index between 
illiquidity and volatility are comparable directly. We then re-estimate the model and 
calculate the spillover balance index in the same way. The results are reported in Table 
6. The main conclusions remain unchanged. Illiquidity is a more important channel than 
volatility in spreading shocks across global equity markets. Moreover, US market 
illiquidity plays a central role in this process.  
5.4 Contemporaneous cross-correlation of the illiquidity and volatility 
innovations 
We examine the cross-correlations of innovations obtained from the MEM 
estimation. The unexpected arrival of information, as well as unexpected shocks to 
investors’ liquidity, can cause unanticipated trading needs, and, in turn, unanticipated 
                                                 
10
 We thank an anonymous referee for his suggestion.  
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fluctuations in liquidity and volatility. It is of interest to examine whether such 
fluctuations are correlated across equity markets. We obtain the illiquidity and volatility 
innovations from the MEM estimation in (9) and (10), and calculate their cross-
correlation matrix. The Spearman’s correlation matrix is adopted, as it is more general 
and can account for possible nonlinearity and outliers in the volatility and illiquidity 
series. The results are summarized in Table 7.  
We first find that the UK, GE, and FR markets have a relatively large correlation 
(0.53 to 0.70) in illiquidity between each other, while the illiquidity correlations 
between them and other markets are small, Similarly, the volatility correlations between 
the three European markets are large (0.71 to 0.79), while the volatility correlations 
between them and other markets are small. These suggest a certain degree of illiquidity 
and volatility commonality in the European equity markets.  
We also see that innovations between illiquidity and volatility of their own markets 
are positively correlated. This suggests that higher return volatility is associated with 
higher illiquidity (Stoll, 1978a; Subrahmanyam, 1994). However, the correlation is 
relatively small (between 0.02 and 0.36). The cross-correlation between illiquidity of 
one market and volatility of other markets is very low for all the eight markets, suggest 
no contemporaneous cross-correlation between liquidity of one market and volatility of 
other markets.   
Overall, these results indicate that there is a certain degree of commonality in 
European stock markets, in terms of both illiquidity and volatility. However, there 
would appear to be no commonalities in the global markets. 
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Table 7: Spearman's Correlation coefficients matrix of illiquidity/volatility residuals for all markets 
 US CA UK GE FR JP HK AU  US CA UK GE FR JP HK AU 
             Illiquidity and Illiquidity            
US 1.00                        
CA 0.40 1.00                      
UK 0.27 0.22 1.00                    
GE 0.26 0.16 0.53 1.00                  
FR 0.29 0.21 0.60 0.70 1.00                
JP -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 1.00              
HK 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.20 1.00            
AU -0.01 0.06 0.09 -0.03 0.04 0.25 0.24 1.00          
                  
        Volatility and Illiquidity   Volatility and Volatility 
US 0.25 0.13 0.24 0.25 0.23 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03  1.00               
CA 0.09 0.17 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.01  0.55 1.00             
UK 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.01  0.48 0.40 1.00           
GE 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.06 -0.04  0.39 0.31 0.71 1.00         
FR 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.03 -0.01  0.42 0.34 0.79 0.79 1.00       
JP 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.15 0.05 0.06  0.09 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.10 1.00     
HK 0.00 0.04 0.00  -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.03  0.04 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.25 1.00   
AU -0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.17 0.16 0.36  0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.23 0.11 1.00 
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5.5 Shock propagations for three crucial events 
Lastly, we use the MEM-based impulse response to show how the shocks propagate to other 
markets for a few events. We investigate the evolution of volatility and illiquidity as a 
consequence of three crucial episodes (events).  
The first episode we report is the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on August 9, 2007, which 
is regarded as the beginning of the global financial crisis. The second episode we report is on 
July 13, 2010, which is the beginning of the Eurozone debt crisis, as pointed out by Righi and 
Geretta (2011) based on structural change tests. The third episode that we report is the UK 
Brexit referendum on June 23, 2016.   
First, let us take the US as the market to be shocked, considering August 9, 2007, as the 
starting date. Applying our procedure in (17) and taking K=200 to allow the shocks disappear 
completely11, we obtain the curves in Figure 2. We observe that shocks on illiquidity and 
volatility in the US have a lagged impact on illiquidity and volatility in the other markets. On 
the response to the US illiquidity shock, we observe a high impact on US illiquidity (about 0.8) 
with a monotonically declining response and a few days ahead lower impact (mostly between 
10% and 20%) on JA, HK, GE and AU markets. The latter response grows over time and 
reaches its peak between ten and thirty days (hump shape or momentum). On the response to 
US volatility shocks, we observe a high impact on US volatility (about 0.8) with a 
monotonically declining response and a few days ahead lower impact (mostly between 0.3 and 
0.5) in the other markets. The latter response grows over time and reaches its peak between 
two and ten days (hump shape or momentum).   
Second, taking GE as the market to be shocked, and considering July 13, 2010 (EU 
Sovereign debt crisis), as the starting date, by applying our procedure, we obtain the curves in 
Figure 3. We observe that shocks on the illiquidity and volatility of GE markets have little 
impact on the illiquidity and volatility of other markets, as the impulse response functions for 
other markets decline monotonically.  
Third, we take the UK as the market to be shocked, considering June 23, 2016 (Brexit 
referendum), as the starting date, by applying our procedure, we obtain the curves in Figure 4. 
We observe similar patterns as in Figure 3. Again the shocks on illiquidity and have little 
impact on the illiquidity and volatility of other markets, as the impulse response functions for 
other markets are almost monotonically declining.  
                                                 
11
 We follow Engle et al. (2012) and choose K=200 to allow the shock to disappear completely.  
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By comparing the three sets of events, the US market and the global financial crisis seem 
to have played a major role in the evolution and interdependence of the volatility and illiquidity 
in global equity markets. The regional crisis and regional market has little impact on the 
evolution of volatility and illiquidity globally.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose an MEM for the dynamics of illiquidity and volatility. We empirically 
study the illiquidity spillover effects in eight developed equity markets during and after the 
recent financial crisis.  Furthermore, we model dynamics of the illiquidity and volatility jointly, 
so that we can investigate interdependence between illiquidity and volatility among the equity 
markets.  
We apply our analysis to the equity markets for the period 2007-2016, devoting particular 
attention to the treatment of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis period. We find that equity 
markets are significantly interdependent, both in terms of volatility and illiquidity. No markets 
are independent from others. The global financial crisis brings significant changes in the 
volatility and illiquidity; most markets show an increase in volatility and illiquidity spillover 
effects during the crisis. Furthermore, volatility and liquidity transmission are highly relevant. 
There are significant causal effects from illiquidity to volatility across borders, and vice versa.  
However, the causal effects from illiquidity to volatility (and from volatility to illiquidity) of 
its own markets are insignificant.   
By comparing the spillover balance index between illiquidity and volatility, we find that 
illiquidity is a more important channel than volatility in propagating the shocks in global equity 
markets. The results also indicate that there are contemporaneous commonalities in regional 
stock markets, both in terms of illiquidity and volatility.  The US market and global financial 
crisis seem to have played a major role in the evolution and interdependence of volatility and 
illiquidity in global equity markets.  
Our results show an overall crucial role for illiquidity in the US market in influencing other 
equity markets’ illiquidity and volatility. These findings are of importance for policy makers 
as well as institutional and private investors in the following way: 
1) Markets are highly interdependent in terms of both volatility and illiquidity. 
Consequently, international portfolio managers should not only consider the linkage in 
terms of return and return volatility, but also the linkage in illiquidity in international 
equity markets when constructing their portfolios. 
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2) There are causal effects from illiquidity to volatility across borders, but no casual effects 
from illiquiidy to volatility within the same market. This has implications for risk 
managers because they can build more accurate forecasting models of volatility by 
incorporating past illiquidity from overseas markets into their specification.  
3) Illiquidity in the US market plays a crucial role in spreading shocks across global equity 
markets, with the global financial crisis most likely caused by illiquidity shocks 
originating in the US. Regulators should therefore focus on ensuring that markets in the 
US have sufficient liquidity in order to avoid future crises. 
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Figure 1: Stock indices, illiquidity proxies and realized volatilities for all markets. 
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Figure 2: MEM Impulse Response Functions: Originating Markets: US- Starting data: 16/09/2008 (Lehman Brothers bankruptcy). 
        
 
Figure 3: MEM Impulse Response Functions: Originating Markets: GE- Starting data: 13/07/2010 (EU Sovereign debt crisis) 
 
                                      
N
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Figure 4: MEM Impulse Response Functions: Originating Markets: UK- Starting data: 23/06/2016 (Brexit). 
 
 
Note: the confident interval is not reported due to the lack of space. However, all the IRF are in the 95% significant interval. 
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Appendix A: Estimation results from MEM 
 
Table 7: Estimated Coefficients – illiquidity model 
 
 US CA UK GE FR JP HK AU 
 
w 0.066 0.019 0.025 0.067 0.041 0.032 0.084 0.038 
 
�     0.011     0.005     
 
� 0.846 0.924 0.915 0.626 0.904 0.908 0.808 0.877 
 
DC 0.025     0.063   0.066     
Illiquidity � �ܵ−1     -0.017   -0.019       
 
���−1         0.006   0.057 0.037 
 
�ܭ�−1     0.011           
 
ܩܧ�−1                 
 
ܨܴ�−1 -0.007           -0.017   
 
ܬ��−1           0.005   -0.014 
 
ܪܭ�−1       0.069         
 
���−1       0.062 0.027       
Volatility � �ܵ−1                 
 
���−1             -0.021   
 
�ܭ�−1       0.232     0.100   
 
ܩܧ�−1           0.008     
 
ܨܴ�−1                 
 
ܬ��−1                 
 
ܪܭ�−1       0.051         
 
���−1         -0.013 -0.018 -0.038   
Illiquidity  
*DC 
� �ܵ−1 0.005       -0.001       ���−1   -0.018     0.062       
 
�ܭ�−1     -0.004         0.203 
 
ܩܧ�−1             0.093 -0.030 
 
ܨܴ�−1         -0.079     -0.058 
 
ܬ��−1               0.033 
 
ܪܭ�−1             -0.082 -0.072 
 
���−1           -0.142   -0.040 
Volatility 
*DC 
� �ܵ−1                 ���−1                 
 
�ܭ�−1       -0.136         
 
ܩܧ�−1   -0.013 0.005           
 
ܨܴ�−1   0.025             
 
ܬ��−1             -0.037 0.003 
 
ܪܭ�−1       -0.097 -0.007       
 
���−1         0.022 0.088 0.034   
 γ 0.156 0.093 0.118 0.129 0.105 0.118 0.109 0.119 
 ϕ1 1.322 1.629 1.881 0.870 1.757 1.354 2.082 1.691 
 ϕ2 0.765 0.622 0.509 1.576 0.589 0.776 0.494 0.635 
Loglik  -1236.5 -954.7 -1319.6 -1699.6 -1680.3 -1966.7 -1593.6 -1151.1 
BIC  2540.5 1976.9 2706.7 3496.6 3473.0 4023.4 3299.7 2414.7 
LB(12)  18.98 9.30 8.46 7.21 9.23 22.92 21.48 10.98 
 
  
 35 
 
Table 8: Estimated Coefficients – realized volatility model 
 
 US CA UK GE FR JP HK AU 
 
w   0.008 0.021 0.046 0.087 0.083 0.084 0.044 
 
� 0.305 0.302 0.299 0.378 0.366 0.403 0.269 0.206 
 
� 0.417 0.380 0.388 0.452 0.337 0.389 0.510 0.197 
 
DC       -0.100         
Illiquidity � �ܵ−1   -0.017     -0.021   -0.024 0.108 
 
���−1                 
 
�ܭ�−1   0.029             
 
ܩܧ�−1                 
 
ܨܴ�−1 -0.019 -0.011             
 
ܬ��−1 0.031 0.021 0.013       -0.011 -0.016 
 
ܪܭ�−1 0.034         -0.022   -0.013 
 
���−1     -0.023   -0.022       
Volatility � �ܵ−1 0.305   0.048   0.115       
 
���−1   0.302 0.089     0.125 0.082 0.068 
 
�ܭ�−1     0.299       0.218 0.124 
 
ܩܧ�−1       0.378     0.026 0.053 
 
ܨܴ�−1         0.366   -0.094 -0.051 
 
ܬ��−1           0.403   0.016 
 
ܪܭ�−1 0.094 0.045         0.269 0.047 
 
���−1   0.096 0.155 0.229 0.311     0.206 
Illiquidity  
*DC 
� �ܵ−1           0.176   0.112 ���−1                 
 
�ܭ�−1       -0.159         
 
ܩܧ�−1     0.070 0.195 -0.056       
 
ܨܴ�−1                 
 
ܬ��−1 -0.100               
 
ܪܭ�−1                 
 
���−1 0.121     0.009         
Volatility 
*DC 
� �ܵ−1 -0.271               ���−1 0.352     0.279 0.047       
 
�ܭ�−1                 
 
ܩܧ�−1     -0.169 -0.311         
 
ܨܴ�−1                 
 
ܬ��−1 0.330 0.104 0.201 0.115 -0.027 -0.078     
 
ܪܭ�−1 -0.106 -0.040             
 
���−1   -0.078             
 
γ 0.253 0.193 0.000  0.078 0.092 0.113 0.059 0.112 
 ϕ1 0.561 0.610 0.730 0.678 0.674 0.507 0.655 0.575 
 ϕ2 7.589 7.502 8.273 7.630 8.775 9.958 7.915 8.750 
Loglik  -624.3 184.9 187.7 -1173.8 -1129.6 -844.5 -538.7 177.0 
BIC  1368.6 -257.4 -277.8 2452.5 2356.7 1763.9 1167.4 -234.1 
LB(12)  8.49 7.71 19.70 12.45 19.88 9.00 5.16 91.21* 
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Appendix B: Generalized gamma distribution  
 
The density for Generalized Gamma distribution is: 
 
1 2
2
1
1
1 2
1
( )( | , ) exp( ), 0( )
t
t t tf
              
So, ( ) 1tE   . 
 
